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Abstract 
 This commentary considers Simmering’s monograph on a dynamic-systems theoretical 
approach to understanding working memory development, with reference to the past, present, 
and future.  In the section on the past, I attempt to provide a further historical context for the 
work, discussing from where it stemmed and how it is unique.  In a second section I contemplate 
the purpose of the present modeling.  The aim of the monograph may be primarily to establish a 
simple possible account of development based on neural connection strength and dynamic 
principles; it should not be judged as a proposal of what is necessarily true. Finally, in the section 
on the future, I suggest some phenomena that dissociate performance levels from stability over 
time and therefore appear to require modifications of the theory.  Several suggestions are made 
as to where further refinement of the modeling effort could lead.     
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Exploring the Possible and Necessary in Working Memory Development 
 
Upon my arrival at the University of Missouri, where I have worked for most of my 
career, I was assigned to a laboratory recently vacated by Esther Thelen, a foremother of the 
present-day interest in dynamic systems theory as applied to child development.  When Esther 
moved out of her infant-stepping lab, she left attached to the door one of my favorite cartoons, 
which I have since misplaced but have thought of often. It featured a beaver talking to another 
animal, with an enormous hydroelectric dam in the background.  Of this structure the beaver 
remarked, “Well, I didn’t actually build it, but it was based on my ideas.” The dynamic systems 
modeling of processes underlying working memory from infancy through childhood in the 
present monograph by Simmering might be viewed as a hydroelectric version of earlier beaver 
dams.  My contribution is to comment on how the dam is related to past work (the history), how 
well it is operating (the modeling), and where we might go from here (the persistent questions).  
The Past:  A Little History 
As series of important beaver dams, first there are the empirical phenomena. Working 
memory is a critical process in human cognition, representing the small amount of information 
that can be held in mind and used in the service of many processes:  remembering the early part 
of a sentence long enough to integrate it with what comes later, carrying a digit when doing 
mental addition, using mental imagery to rotate puzzle pieces to see which ones might fit 
together or, in an infant, perhaps comparing a babbled utterance to an adult model or retaining 
memory of Mom as she disappears behind a door.  The study of working memory may be as old 
as the study of memory generally. Ebbinghaus (1885/1913) is typically credited with initiating 
the scientific study of memory, in his groundbreaking research in which he repeatedly tested 
Cowan commentary on Simmering, Page 4 
himself until he learned series of nonsense syllables.  What is germane here is his finding that, 
although a list of 12 syllables could be learned only after 16 repetitions, a shorter list of 7 
syllables could be learned in a single presentation or, as he put it (p. 33), a “first fleeting grasp” 
of the items.  Studies of the childhood development of immediate memory soon followed in the 
form of memory span experiments (Bolton, 1892; Jacobs, 1887).  
Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) introduced the term working memory to describe 
memory for one’s near and distant future plans, and Sperling (1960) greatly expanded our 
understanding of temporary memory in general, and specifically in the case of visual stimuli. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) popularized the term working memory and applied it to a 
multicomponent system with devoted automatic buffers (verbal and by implication nonverbal 
visual) as well as an attention-demanding central resource comprising executive processes.  Tests 
of limited resources were later extended to infant and child development by numerous 
investigators, for example in tests of a relation between memory and processing speed in 
children (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Hulme, Thomson, Muir, & Lawrence, 1984). More 
recent and closely-germane strands of the developmental research history are well-covered in the 
monograph.    
A complementary set of key beaver dams are the theoretical explanations of the 
development of working memory and cognition.  As noted in the monograph, many investigators 
have offered verbal and pictorial explanations for how working memory operates, or how it 
develops.  That is still a far cry from a principled, mathematical model of how working memory 
develops. One can imagine that certain verbal or pictorial models lead to particular predictions, 
but sometimes this kind of speculation depends on assumptions that have not been made clear, 
and sometimes are not fully appreciated even by the investigator doing the speculating. 
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Mathematical modeling leaves less room for unappreciated assumptions because one needs to fill 
in the assumptions to yield the desired mathematical result.   
Work using equations to specify psychological processes seems to have begun with Ernst 
Weber and Gustav Fechner in the late 1800s.  Estes (1950) was perhaps the first to show that 
mathematical precision could be brought to the task of stating models of learning and memory in 
a more rigorous fashion, and many related approaches have followed. Investigators sometimes 
called neo-Piagetian (McLaughlin, 1963; Pascual-Leone & Smith, 1969) used concepts of 
temporary memory and information processing to explain conceptual development in childhood, 
including some mathematical specification. Others have pioneered various principles that were 
incorporated into the present modeling, such as the principle of lateral inhibition applied to 
cognitive concepts in memory by Walley and Weiden (1973).   
The Present Use of Mathematical Modeling   
Before discussing the topic of mathematical modeling further, I would note that my 
qualifications to this topic include being all over the map in terms of my attitude.  I have a love-
hate relationship with modeling. I can see important pitfalls of mathematical modeling, and I can 
see enormous benefits.  I have ignored some mathematical models that I am expected to know, 
and I have done mathematical modeling myself (generally with technical help). However one 
feels when reading or trying to read a mathematically-involved work like the present monograph, 
I am probably sympathetic. 
To become a connoisseur of mathematical modeling, one must first appreciate that there 
are multiple aims of the modeling, and the correct aim must be attributed for a model to be 
appreciated.  The present modeling shows how certain theoretical accounts of working memory 
development are possible, not necessarily how they are necessary.  Is it possible to explain why 
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children do steadily better in working memory tasks as they get older? Why some materials are 
remembered better than others?  Why what develops may include both the number of items in 
working memory (for example, how many colors) and the precision by which those items are 
represented (the fidelity of the remembered shades)?  Can we understand why performance 
depends to some extent on the individual and to some extent on the task he or she is to carry out?  
How about dependence on the similarity of items to be remembered and the interference between 
them (cf., Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2012)?  Can all of these factors 
be understood with the same simple principles, tying together development from infancy through 
childhood?  In the present work, these questions are all answered in the affirmative. A working 
assumption is made that, as infants and children develop, the connectivity in the neural 
architecture is strengthened.  At least with one reasonable architecture, the simple principle of 
connectivity is said to account for all of these phenomena.   
 For the modeling results to be useful, their limits must be understood.  There need be no 
claim that the details of the architecture are in fact correct.  Perhaps a completely different model 
would also explain the facts equally well. What can be established, though, is that the model, 
though itself complex in its mathematical details, is essentially an argument for simplicity. 
Before, there may have been a perceived need for different principles to explain the infant and 
child data.  Several complex mechanisms might have been thrown in to explain separately the 
development of capacity in terms of the number of items represented in working memory and the 
precision of the representations. Instead, these details can be seen as falling out of the same 
architecture with the principle of increasing connectivity, leading to increasing stability of the 
representations. 
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One naturally hopes that what has been proven possible in one’s model eventually proves 
to be the actual case, or even proves to be necessary to account for the results.  Then one could 
be considered “right.”  Even without being right, modeling work is useful as it sharpens up the 
concepts being discussed, which aids in evaluating them.  
What the model does best is to strengthen the plausibility of a dynamic systems approach.  
As stated in the monograph, “Within dynamic systems theory, the focus is on how behavior 
emerges from multiple underlying causes, encouraging researchers to explore the various 
contributions to behavior, and to evaluate the robustness of behavior relative to the 
circumstances required to support them.” This mundane-sounding theoretical statement actually 
runs counter to the thinking of Jean Piaget, who tended to believe that once a mental structure 
was fully acquired, it was robustly demonstrated across task demands. The neo-Piagetians would 
have disagreed.  Once, as a teaching assistant during graduate school in the later 1970s, I 
confirmed to my own satisfaction the neo-Piagetian stance.  By mid-childhood, children are 
supposed to understand that water poured from a squat beaker to a thin one does not change in 
volume, and that clay rolled from a ball into a sausage shape does not change in volume either. 
With undergraduate students, I upped the level of complexity by asking what would happen if 
heavy clay in a ball shape versus a sausage shape were totally submerged into identical beakers 
of water. Many college students incorrectly predicted that the sausage-shaped clay would raise 
the water level more, a failure of the conservation-of-matter principle in a complex context. 
The model also shows that there is room for error in the encoding, maintenance, 
processing, decision, and response phases of a task.  We may choose only one of these as the 
source of error in a particular simplified model, but no model of behavior across contexts can 
survive without coming to grips with processing during all of the phases of the task. 
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For the Future:  Some Unanswered Questions 
 The first and perhaps foremost unanswered question I have is how long the model can 
persist before the need to modify it sets in.  When the model does have to be modified, how 
extreme will the modification have to be?  How many detailed facts can the model account for 
and still elegantly show that the increasing-connectivity principle accounts for the development 
of working memory across tasks? 
 There is some mystery left for me with regards to the effect of the similarity of the items 
to be remembered.  It was stated that “When multiple peaks form near one another, their related 
inhibition combines, making it more difficult to form new peaks.” Some of the sources cited, 
however, indicate that sets of more similar items, such as several shades of green, can be 
remembered better than sets of less similar items, such as different colors together (e.g., Lin & 
Luck, 2009). I cannot figure out how to reconcile the principle with the findings.  
 Although the developmental results that were accounted for are rich and varied, they do 
generally seem to involve just about every aspect of working memory performance getting better 
with age. That pattern of development in itself has been referred to as “the dull hypothesis” 
(Perfect & Maylor, 2000); the dull hypothesis can be rejected when one finds an interaction 
between tasks and age groups. To some extent, in the present approach, the dull hypothesis is 
rejected in the fitting of the model to young children in two tasks, the typical infant task and the 
typical child task. 
 In the future, however, it may be necessary to reject the dull hypothesis more severely.  
Among the predictions of the model is that with development, memory representations gain more 
stability and therefore are preserved better across a retention interval; that is, in more mature 
participants, the representations decay less than they do in younger ones. In general, though, we 
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have not found that decay difference across age groups.  In one procedure (Cowan, Nugent, 
Elliott, & Saults, 2000), children were tested on memory for lists of digits that were ignored at 
the time of their presentation and then occasionally were cued for recall 1, 5, or 10 s after the last 
digit in the list. With the list length adjusted to each individual’s span, the rates of decay of the 
list across 10 s did not change significantly between 7 and 20 years.  There was, however, a large 
age effect restricted to the final serial position, which could be accounted for by age differences 
in either sensory memory persistence or covert attention-shifting to the end of the list.  There is a 
similar finding of an age difference in the decay of isolated tone information (Keller & Cowan, 
1994). Using spatial arrays of unfamiliar characters, followed by a mask to reduce the use of 
sensory memory, Cowan. Ricker, Clark, Hinrichs, and Glass (2014) found no difference between 
7-year-olds and college students in the rate of decay of memory for array characters across 10 s.  
Taken together, these results suggest that a key principle of the model may not apply in the same 
way to sensory and conceptual information.  
 To understand age differences in the decay of information, perhaps one needs to specify 
the mechanism that produces stabilization. Camos and Barrouillet (2011) have studied the ability 
to use spare time to refresh working memory representations.  They presented series of animal 
pictures to be remembered and, between each pair of animals, either 1 or 2 colored spots to be 
named. An important change occurred between 6 and 7 years of age.  In 6-year-olds 
(kindergarteners), performance was better when the total time between animals was shorter.  In 
7-year-olds (first-graders), performance was better when the proportion of time between animals 
that was free for refreshing was high, no matter whether the total time was short or long.  The 
results suggested that 6-year-olds do not use the refreshing process and therefore are subject to 
steady decay, whereas decay is counteracted by refreshing in 7-year-olds. This study differs from 
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the ones by Cowan et al. (2000, 2014) in that those studies presented conditions for which 
refreshing would be difficult or impossible (because the items were unattended digits or attended 
arrays of unfamiliar characters). In all, the results suggest that age differences in instability of 
representations might often be attributed to the growing effectiveness of attention-demanding 
refreshing processes.  The idea is that only in tasks in which older participants can refresh items 
can they stabilize their working memory representations during the maintenance period better 
than younger, less mature participants. 
 The notion that attention-based processes are used for refreshing does not contradict the 
model presented in the present monograph, but it does appear to restrict the scope of the model. 
The scope may have to be restricted to situations in which there are age differences in a process 
that can be mapped onto better stability of the traces.  For some stimuli, in some age groups, 
such as letters in children 5-7 years old, there will be age differences in knowledge that can result 
in differences in stability of the representations that are already manifest at the time of encoding. 
For other stimuli, age differences occur at the time of maintenance through refreshing.  These 
sorts of differences would be expected to produce age differences in decay.  For stimuli that are 
neither encoded nor refreshed advantageously by older age groups, there may be no difference in 
decay.   
 The finding of no age difference in decay is interesting when it is obtained with the list 
length adjusted to the participant’s ability (e.g., Cowan, 2000) or with age groups at different 
levels of performance despite no decay differences (e.g., Cowan et al., 2014).  The intriguing 
thing here is that age group effects in performance level and decay are dissociated. It is unclear 
to me how to modify the present dynamic systems model to produce this dissociation.  It seems 
as if the “self-sustaining” state of working memory may be self-sustaining in some ways based 
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on automatic processes (such as encoding clarity that may often favor more mature participants 
who have more knowledge) and self-sustaining in other ways only when voluntary strategies can 
be implemented (such as memory persistence over time, which may favor more mature 
participants only for stimuli that lend themselves to refreshing or rehearsal processes). 
 Beyond empirical issues such as this, it is possible to use modeling in a more specific 
manner than was done in the present monograph.  Many researchers attempt to produce models 
that match the data so closely that they can present a pattern of predicted results in one panel of a 
figure and a panel of obtained results next to it.  In this kind of approach, to get the data and 
model to resemble one another so closely, there are usually a host of auxiliary assumptions 
resulting in parameters in the equations with arbitrary values.  The strength of the approach is 
that there can be no doubt that one can get the actual pattern of results from the model; the down 
side is that one still has to figure out how much of the success comes from parameters that reflect 
basic principles of the model (e.g., connection strength) and how much of the success depends 
instead on parameters that were supposed to be incidental or unimportant but actually are doing 
the heavy lifting, forcing the model to match the data in a manner that has little to do with its 
stated principles. A related problem is that it is difficult to get these more specific models to 
account for a variety of circumstances as the present modeling does; for example, I have seen 
serial recall models that could not be modified in a foreseeable way to account for free recall.   
 In the more specific modeling approaches, one often compares multiple models that 
differ in important ways and finds out which model fits the data better according to standard fit 
statistics. In the present dynamic systems approach, it would be possible to present models with 
connectivity that develops at different rates for different layers in the model, which may make 
the model more complex but may be consistent with evidence that different parts of the brain 
Cowan commentary on Simmering, Page 12 
develop at different rates (Sowell et al., 2003; Thomason et al., 2008).  Some fit statistics (such 
as AIC and BIC) are designed to penalize models for extra complexity and see if the more 
complex models are worth it.    
 Finally, modeling is a tricky exercise when one takes the popular approach of comparing 
two or more possible models to determine which model is more apt.  In a recent effort (Cowan et 
al., in press), we tried out models of how adults perform in a new task in which they were 
presented with two arrays of colored spots in succession, and asked to judge how many of the 
array items changed color between a studied display and a test display. In our first modeling 
approach, a separate decision was assumed to be made by the participant for each array item.  
The model fit the pattern of means beautifully, but utterly failed to fit the distribution of 
responses in each condition, leading to a rejection of the model in favor of other models that 
would not have been considered, had the first model not failed. 
 To sum up, modeling is a tricky enterprise.  The present work very nicely sets out a 
simple neural scheme and then follows the implications of that scheme for working memory 
development in the case of visual arrays of items to be remembered.  Perhaps the strongest 
recommendation for the model is that it served as a motivator to get Simmering to test the same 
children on both the usual infant and usual child procedures, leading to an elegant set of results 
that in turn led to further refinement of the model.  The model served as a very nice proof that 
one can go far with basic, elegant neural principles.  In a similar manner, in the future one could 
imagine that the modeling would help to guide further work on the nature of decay effects, the 
relation between items in working memory and precision of the representations, and potential 
differences between the rates of development of these concepts. It might lead to predictions 
about when and in what way working memory can be trained.  In normal individuals there has 
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been little evidence that working memory training helps to improve tasks other than those similar 
to the one trained (e.g., Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013; Redick et al., 2013), but there might be 
more hope in individuals with processing abnormalities.  It is possible to impair a model and 
then see how it might be trained, leading to predictions that could be tested in real individuals,  
The work illustrates that further progress depends on close communication between 
researchers with empirical and modeling orientations, as well as between researchers 
emphasizing development in infancy versus later childhood.   
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